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1. Introduction
We consider an auction with risk neutral agents having independent private val-
uations for several heterogenous objects. Most of the literature on revenue-
maximizing auctions has focused on the sale of one good or on the sale of several
identical units (thus yielding one-dimensional informational models). Two rea-
sons for ine¢ciency in revenue-maximizing auctions have been identi…ed 1) The
(monopolist) seller can increase revenue by restricting supply. 2) A revenue maxi-
mizing seller will sell to bidders with the highest ”virtual” valuations (see Myerson,
1981). Virtual valuations are adjusted valuations that take into account bidders’
informational rents, and depend on the distribution of private information. Asym-
metries among bidders (and possibly other properties of these distributions) drive
a wedge between virtual and true valuations, leading to ine¢ciencies (see Ausubel
and Cramton, 1998 for a recent discussion of these issues).
Our purpose here is to illustrate in the simplest possible way that a revenue-
maximizing seller of several heterogenous objects has incentives to ”misallocate”
the sold objects even in symmetric settings, and no matter what the (symmetric)
function governing the distribution of private information is. This ine¢ciency
result should be contrasted with the e¢ciency result in Armstrong (1998) that
applies only to some cases with discrete distributions of valuations.
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2. The Model
A seller has K heterogenous objects to sell, and there are N potential buyers.
Agent i; i = 0; 1; 2; ::n is characterized by a vector vi = (vi1; v
i
2; :::v
i
K), where v
i
k
is agent i0s valuation for object k; and where agent zero denotes the seller. Let
P = (P 0; P 1; :::; Pn) be a partition of the set of objects. Assume that buyer i; i =
1; :::; n acquires the subset of objects P i and he makes a payment xi to the seller:
Then i0s utility is given by
P
k2P i vik¡xi; and the seller’s utility is given by
Pn
i=1 x
i¡P
k2KnP 0 v0k . We consider a standard continuous ”private independent values”
model, where f i(¢) > 0 denotes the density function underlying the distribution
of vi on the hypercube [vi1; v
i
1] £ :::[viK; viK ]. We assume that the buyers are
symmetric in the sense that for all i; j; i 6= j; it holds: 1) 8k; vik = vjk = vk and
vik = v
j
k = vk; 2) 8v; f i(v) = f j(v) = f(v) ;
3. E¢cient Auctions
An auction is (ex-post) e¢cient if, for all possible realizations (v1; :::;vn), the
resulting equilibrium partition P(v1; :::;vn) has the feature that,for all possible
partitions P;
Pn
i=0
P
k2P i v
i
k ¸
Pn
i=0
P
k2P i vik :
It is easy to construct a mechanism that allocates the goods e¢ciently: The
seller conducts K separate auctions, such that at auction k good k is sold through
a second-price sealed-bid auction with reserve price v0k: Since each good is allocated
to the agent that values it most, e¢ciency is immediate. The seller’s expected
revenue is then given by E(
Pn
k=1(max(v
0
k; v
(2)
k ))) where for every k; v
(2)
k denotes
the second highest value among v1k; :::; v
n
k ; and where E denotes the expectation
operator.
4. Bundling and Revenue Maximization
In order to completely separate the misallocation e¤ect from the supply restriction
e¤ect, we assume below that the seller is constrained to always sell the goods,
and we focus on the e¢ciency of the allocation among buyers. We thus restrict
attention to partitions P = (P 0; P 1; :::; P n) such that P 0 = ;. We say that an
auction is (ex-post) e¢cient if, for all possible realizations (v1; :::;vn), the resulting
equilibrium partition P(v1; :::;vn) has the feature that, for all partitions P with
P 0 = ;; Pni=1Pk2P i vik ¸ Pni=1Pk2P i vik .
We …rst focus on the two-buyers case. In this framework we can show that a
revenue-maximizing auction is never ex-post e¢cient. If the seller conducts sepa-
rate second-price auctions (without a reserve price), the allocation among buyers
is e¢cient, and it yields an expected revenue ofE(
PK
k=1min(v
1
k; v
2
k)): But the seller
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can also conduct a second-price sealed-bid auction (without a reserve price) for the
bundle consisting of all k objects. In this case, the seller’s expected revenue is given
by E(min(
PK
k=1 v
1
k;
PK
k=1 v
2
k)): Note that for any realizations v
1 = (v11; :::; v
1
K) and
v2 = (v21; :::; v
2
K) it holds that min(
PK
k=1 v
1
k;
PK
k=1 v
2
k) ¸
PK
k=1min(v
1
k; v
2
k) , with
strict inequality for a positive measure of realizations. Hence, the bundling auc-
tion surely achieves a strictly higher revenue than the separate auctions. This
elegant and simple argument is due to Palfrey (1983).
To complete the argument, we use the celebrated Revenue Equivalence The-
orem (see Myerson, 1981, and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1988), which asserts that
in continuous frameworks the expected transfers to the seller in any incentive-
compatible mechanism are determined, up to a constant, by the allocation rule.
By an application of this theorem, any incentive-compatible, e¢cient allocation
mechanism such that a buyer with valuation v = (v1; ::;vK) gets an equilibrium
payo¤ of zero, yields exactly the same expected revenue for the seller. In the class
of e¢cient auctions, the revenue-maximizing procedure must obviously leave a
buyer having type v = (v1; ::;vK) with a zero-payo¤1. We thus obtain that the
separate second-price auctions are revenue-maximizing among all e¢cient mecha-
nisms. Hence, we have shown that the bundling auction achieves a strictly higher
revenue than any e¢cient mechanism, and that the revenue maximizing auction
(among all mechanisms) must necessarily involve some misallocation of goods
among buyers.
For the case of more than two buyers, the result is less clear cut: the bundling
auction is revenue superior to any e¢cient auction if the expectation of the sec-
ond highest sum of valuations, i.e. E((
PK
k=1 v
i
k)
(2)) ; is larger than the sum of
the expectations of the second highest valuations, i.e.
PK
k=1E(v
(2)
k ): This rather
complex condition involving second-order statistics of convolutions may be ful-
…lled for some distributions of valuations, but may be violated for others. In any
case, even if the condition is violated, there is no particular reason to expect the
revenue-maximizing auction to be e¢cient (note also that this condition does not
involve the hazard rates used to compute virtual valuations).
It is interesting to note that, if the number of buyers goes to in…nity, then the
expected revenue from the K separate, e¢cient auctions,
PK
k=1E(v
(2)
k ); converges
to
PK
k=1 vk: Hence, in the limit, the seller can extract all available surplus
2, and
the e¢cient procedure is revenue maximizing.
1If such a buyer has a positive expected payo¤, the seller can increase revenue by imposing
an entry fee, without a¤ecting incentives.
2Monderer and Tenneholz (1999) derive a similar result in a more complex model where
buyers are risk-averse.
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5. Concluding Comments
It is very di¢cult to generally characterize the revenue maximizing auction for
multi-object settings, since one needs to solve a maximization program under com-
plex integrability constraints (see Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti, 1999). The
di¢culty is to locate the necessary ine¢ciencies. The nature of these ine¢ciencies
is speci…c to multidimensional informational frameworks.
The focus on e¢ciency often yields an amenable analysis: In the independent
private values model, e¢cient allocation mechanisms exist for arbitrary quasi-
linear preferences, i.e. also for cases where the value of bundle P i for agent i
is not necessarily equal to
P
k2P i vik: An immediate application of the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem shows that, in terms of expected transfers, any e¢cient
mechanisms must be equivalent to some Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanism (see
for example Williams, 1994). For the case of interdependent valuations, Jehiel
and Moldovanu (1998) have shown that e¢cient, incentive compatible allocation
mechanisms for several heterogenous objects need not even exist.
The study of e¢cient multi-object auctions is very important per-se, but it
o¤ers little insight for the revenue-maximization question.
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